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1:  INTRODUCTION
There is nothing particularly new in privatisation initiatives of one sort or another from
governments of various persuasions - and as Wettenhall has argued so disparagingly, the
current moves in Australia represent,‘....the umpteenth wave in a long series of efforts to
make government business behave commercially’1
Privatisation is about ownership - a privatised port like a privatised electricity authority or
airport or shipping line or telecommunications agency - is one in which ownership passes from
the public to the private sector.
But in the conventional wisdom - or more accurately the public perception - there is an
implication that privatisation impacts positively on efficiency.  Efficiency is perceived to
‘suffer’ because governments are concerned with serving masters other than the market -
pressure groups and vested interests and constituents; and because there is the responsibility
of governments to serve the ‘public good’ or the ‘public interest’.
The privatisation of ports, then,  is seen not simply in terms of transfer of ownership but as the
transition of port authorities from statutory authorities or bodies of one sort or another
serving ‘the public good’ to corporations seeking competitive advantage in a free-wheeling,
unconstrained and competitive market place delivering significant efficiencies to the market.
In effect, ownership and efficiency outcomes are perceived to be inextricably linked.
In the Australian context reform initiatives for ports have taken on a variety of forms - from
outright sale and transfer of ownership of the port per se, to the sale of particular assets or
infrastructure or services, or to long term leasing arrangements; or in some cases state
governments, unable to relinquish welfarist concerns and/or some measure of control, have
opted for corporatisation or commercialisation strategies.  These frameworks are variants of
the privatisation model - perhaps not quite the bastard children of privatisation but certainly a
corruption of a market focused model.  In any case there is some considerable way to go to
achieving the market-focused corporations which might be the end product of the privatisation
process and to which we have referred above.
It is not surprising that in periods of significant policy change and the institutional instability
that accompanies such change, it is all too easy to lose sight of principle for detail and to fail
to distinguish between what can and cannot be achieved under varying reform scenarios.
                                      
1 Wettenhall, R. ‘Public Administration Newspeak’, Current Affairs Bulletin 66 (12) May 1990.
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This paper is part of an ongoing research programme into microeconomic reform in the
Australian ports and shipping industries2.  It is the first of what is likely to be a series of
papers assessing ongoing reform initiatives in Australian ports.  It focuses, therefore, on the
actual and proposed changes to port authorities in various states; and in so doing it attempts
to define the central issues in the privatisation and corporatisation debate.
2:  BACKGROUND TO CHANGE
2:1 Pressures for change
In the Australian context the moves to privatise and corporatise ports emerged more or less
simultaneously from two directions - from the perceived urgency to achieve significantly
improved efficiency in the nation’s ports; and from the need for governments, and particularly
state governments, to rationalise structures and budgets.  Government Business Enterprises
(GBEs) came under particular scrutiny in Commissions of Audit in a number of states3 and
tended to be the focus of continuous monitoring4.
Ports, or more accurately port authorities, have been caught in the crossfire - as the nation’s
cargo handling agencies, they are expected to deliver operational efficiencies to their key
players or stakeholders and particularly to shippers/cargo owners and shipowners; and as
statutory authorities and GBEs they must conform to Treasury, Ministerial and Cabinet
demands for financial viability.
It is hardly surprising then, that the reform outcomes of these competing pressures have been
complex and varied and the resultant policy frameworks reflect the conflicts inherent in the
two positions.
2:2  The reform process and port privatisation
In the context of the general process of microeconomic reform in the ports and shipping
industries in Australia the moves to corporatise and privatise ports followed as more or less
inevitable consequences of earlier maritime reform measures.  Shipping reform, initiated by the
federal government along the lines recommended by Crawford5, introduced measures to
revitalise the Australian shipping sector.  Shipping reform, however, was widely recognised as
only a partial solution to an uncompetitive and costly national flag carrier as an inefficient
waterfront also had a major impact on the efficiency of shipping.
                                      
2 The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Australian Chamber of Shipping and the award of the
Chamber’s Research Grant for 1995.
3 Report of the Victorian Commission of Audit (1993)
4 Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises
5 Crawford, J.G. (1983) Revitalisation of Australian Shipping: An Overview, AGPS, Canberra.
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The waterfront, and in particular waterfront labour, was subsequently reformed along the lines
recommended by the Inter-State Commission (ISC)6.  Waterfront reform led to a perceived, if
not a totally effective, deregulation of the labour market with the introduction of enterprise
based agreements and company based employment.  The aim of the Commission was, in
effect, to create a more competitive environment - an environment in which firms, particularly
but not only stevedoring firms, could more effectively control the costs and conditions of their
labour inputs.
The Commission also recognised the impediment to efficient port and shipping operations
which was posed by inefficient and monopolistic port authorities and focused on their roles as
effective administrative agencies.  The Commission raised questions about whether or not
there was an effective and legitimate role for the public sector in ports and, if so,  what that
role should be.  The Industry Commission (IC) subsequently  argued that port authorities
should be granted autonomy from government and bureaucratic interference; that the role of
the port authority was essentially  that of a landlord and that commercial operations were best
left to the private sector.
The port authorities themselves had, for the most part, begun to explore these issues more
vigorously and some had taken initiatives not only to rationalise costs and pricing but also to
examine more closely structural issues.
The upshot was that port administration and the structural and organisational frameworks of
authorities - including questions of ownership - were locked into an agenda for change7.
2:3  Privatisation: ideology of the ‘80s?
In Australia, the 1980s was a decade where governments at both federal and state levels came
under increasing pressure to perform.  This coincided with widespread speculation and
examination of the role of governments in commercial operations and focused in particular on
the efficiency and cost effectiveness of GBEs.  It was part of  a philosophy held particularly in
the private and commercial sectors, that Australia was over-governed and over-regulated.
Governments were seen to be inefficient and costly.  This changing philosophy reflected, by
and large, economic recession, increasing unemployment and growing competition within the
manufacturing sector from newly emerging industrialising nations in East and Southeast Asia.
State governments were under severe economic pressure and drastic reduction in government
spending was called for.  An ethos subsequently emerged accompanied by a strong push for
deregulation and governments at both state and federal levels came under considerable
pressure to withdraw from commercial activities or to make them profitable.
Particularly within the area of GBEs the push for reform intensified throughout the 1980s and
early 1990s.  Commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation became widely accepted
government strategies - that government enterprises had to be exposed to market conditions
                                      
6 Crawford, J.G. (1983) Revitalisation of Australian Shipping: An Overview, AGPS, Canberra.
7 Industry Commission (1993) Port Authority Services and Activities - Draft Report.
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and to competitive forces in order to make them efficient.  Within the maritime environment,
ports which had previously been seen as providing a service by public sector authorities now
had to become efficient  and competitive business operations.  Ports were pressured to be
profitable businesses operating under 'user pays' principles in order to ensure appropriate
returns and maximum cost recovery.
3:  STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONSES
What, then, have been the policy outcomes to date from these pressures for change?
Australian states have, as we have suggested above,  subsequently embraced a number of
different but closely related strategies - privatisation, corporatisation and commercialisation.
Note briefly the fundamental differences between these rather broadly defined strategies -
-  Privatisation is the transfer of public assets to the private sector.  This can be
accomplished by outright sale or lease.  It can refer to the sale of an entire port, a
port service or part of a port operation - a terminal, for example, or a tug or
pilotage operation.  Note well, in this context, that there will be significant
differences in the complexity of procedures as well as in the implications and
impacts.
-  Corporatisation constitutes a corporate restructure.  A public presence in the port is
maintained, albeit much reduced. A government owned corporation is established
essentially to undertake landlord functions.   The adoption of private sector
business principles becomes mandatory and,  in most instances, all commercial
operations in the port are transferred to the private sector.
-  Commercialisation is that process where government retains ownership and control
of the ports. The private sector undertakes many, but not all commercial activities.
A port authority is maintained - one which operates not exclusively as a landlord
but undertakes trade facilitation and other marketing and promotion roles.
All Australian states are presently undergoing port authority reform.  Victoria is privatising its
regional bulk ports and corporatising the port of Melbourne.  With the exception of Western
Australia and Tasmania, all other states are adopting some form of the corporatisation model.
The following section will discuss briefly what strategies are being adopted in each state.
Victoria.  Reform of Victorian ports began when the Port of Melbourne Authority and the
port authorities of Geelong and Portland were declared Reorganising Bodies under the State
Owned Enterprises Act 1992.  Under this Act the state’s ports were transferred to the Office
of State Owned Enterprises.
In 1994 the Victorian Government announced that all four commercial ports would be
privatised, but following intense opposition to the proposed sale of the port of Melbourne,
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government’s revised strategy was a dual policy approach - the corporatisation of the port of
Melbourne and privatisation of the ports of Hastings, Geelong and Portland.
The impact of this strategy is that the port of Melbourne will be a public sector landlord with
responsibilities for land within the port boundary.  Onshore port assets in the ports of
Geelong, Portland and Hastings will be sold outright although the underwater assets and
associated navigational controls for these ports will be retained as public property.
Victoria’s fourteen Associated Ports will be separated from the commercial ports and all non
port related assets, such as the World Trade Centre,  will be sold. Regulatory responsibilities
will be undertaken by the Office of the Regulator General to ensure that non-competitive or
monopoly practices are not abused.
The passing of the Port Services Bill in October 1995 by the Victorian state parliament
divided the responsibilities of the Port of Melbourne Authority into three newly formed
companies - the Victorian Channels Authority with responsibility for all channels in Port
Phillip Bay and the ports of Melbourne and Geelong; the Melbourne Port Corporation, a
public sector landlord with responsibility for land and berths within port boundaries;
Melbourne Port Services with responsibility for the provision of ancillary services within the
port such as cleaning, docking and security.
In January 1996 the Marine Board of Victoria took over responsibility for coordinating the
clean up of oil spills in Victorian waters - this will be contracted out to the Melbourne Port
Services.  The responsibility for dangerous goods and responsibility for marine pollution
investigations and prosecutions was transferred to the Environment Protection Authority in
March 1996.
The first of Victoria’s ports to be sold was Portland in February 1996 for $30m.  The
successful bidder for Geelong is expected to be announced in April 1996 and industry sources
indicate it will reap approximately $90m - $30m for the outright sale and $60m held in
reserve.
New South Wales.  Reform of NSW ports began in 1989 with the introduction of the State
Owned Corporatisation Act designed to commercialise the public sector.  Under this
legislation state owned corporations  were to be established operating with minimum political
and bureaucratic control similar to  any other business in the private sector. They would be
subject to Corporations Law and registered with the Australian Securities Commission.
Under this legislation, each corporation was to have its own Memorandum and Articles of
Association and have an individual share register. Their responsibility was to operate as
efficient businesses, maximising the net worth of the state’s investment, and exhibiting a sense
of social and community  responsibility in undertaking operations.
The introduction in 1989 of the Marine Administration Act  created the commercial ports as
separate authorities - the MSB Hunter Ports Authority, MSB Illawarra Ports Authority and
the MSB Sydney Ports Authority.  These authorities were designed to operate relatively
Reforming Ports
Everett & Robinson
6
independently on a day to day basis but remaining under the umbrella of the MSB for capital
borrowing and development planning.
The Board, since the passing of the Marine Administration Act 1989, has divested itself of
non core activities and has seen itself increasingly focusing on landlord functions.  It has, for
example,  withdrawn from commercial operations - since the closure of the Carrington Basin
loader in Newcastle, the Balmain coal loader and the privatisation of the Port Kembla coal
loader, all commercial operations in NSW ports have been undertaken by the private sector.
In July 1995 with the passing of the Ports Corporatisation and Waterways Management Bill,
the ports of Sydney, Port Kembla and Newcastle were corporatised.  This has meant the
abolition of the MSB and the  three port authorities. The further introduction in July 1995 of
the State Owned Corporations Amendment Act has established ports not as state owned
corporations but as statutory state owned corporations.  Under this amended legislation port
corporations are exempt public authorities for the purposes of Corporations Law.
The legal and administrative framework for the port corporations is designed to closely mimic
that of a private sector company - a board of directors, share capital, issues shares and a
memorandum and articles of association.  But they are not subject to Corporations Law but to
the statute under which they were enacted. This means that they do not have the freedom to
operate as private sector operations and the political and bureaucratic control, rather than
being lessened has, in fact, increased.  But the amended legislation has also meant that the
corporations are not unlike the former statutory authorities and less like a private company -
this is evident in the scope of Ministerial direction, for example, the application of public
sector employment, employee board representation and assigning to the Governor-in-Council
the power to appoint chief executive officers etc.8.
Queensland. The Queensland Government embarked on a programme of corporatisation in
May 1993 with the passing of the Government Owned Corporations Act and the Transport
Infrastructure Act 1994.
The ports of Brisbane, Gladstone and Ports Corporation of Queensland were corporatised in
July 1994 and in July 1995 the ports of Bundaberg, Rockhampton, Mackay, Townsville and
Cairns were corporatised.
Corporatisation for Queensland ports means restructuring them to gain improved performance
by adopting or expanding on business concepts used widely in the private sector.
Unlike NSW ports, the operation of Queensland ports is more aligned with those of private
sector companies and there exists some  ability to operate independently. Being government
owned some government supervision must be maintained, however,  but industry sources
indicate that this is normally restricted to strategic directions and business activities of the
corporations  and the monitoring of performance.
                                      
8 Symonds Travers Morgan Alternative Structural Models for the Management and Operation of the Port of Fremantle,
October 1995.
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Under the Government Owned Corporations Act each corporation has two Shareholding
Ministers representing the owners of the organisation - the government.  In the case of port
authorities, the Treasurer and the Minister for Transport assume this role.   Shareholding
Ministers oversee the government’s interest in the corporation but independent Boards of
Directors are responsible for the operation of the corporation.
Unlike the NSW model, the Queensland port authorities are not exclusively landlords - while
the Port of Brisbane Corporation has transferred most of its commercial functions to the
private sector, some of the bulk ports - Gladstone, for example -  continue to be engaged in
bulk handling operations.
The emphasis of reform in Queensland has been somewhat different and more commercially
oriented, compared with some other states, and government has distanced itself from
operational matters.  Ports do require government approval for capital development but they
can, after negotiating with users, set prices.  The proviso does exists, however, that if they are
under monopoly or near monopoly conditions they will be subject to a level of Shareholding
Ministerial reserve power’.
Another area in which the Queensland model has differed from other states is its focus on
trade growth, rather than on an increase in the rate of return achieved by either a considerable
reduction in staff or by the sale of assets. Staff at the Port of Brisbane Authority, for example,
was reduced by approximately 15 percent between 1988/89 and 1992/93.  This compares with
staff reductions of 54 percent at the PMA; 61 percent at MSB; 47 percent at FPA and 44
percent at SA Department of Marine and Harbours.
This does not mean that the Port of Brisbane Authority has been indifferent to financial
returns.  It does mean, however, that it has relied on revenue growth rather than cost
reductions to drive improved performance.  It also means that revenue growth has come from
increases in trade and changes in trade mix rather than price increases.
South Australia.  Corporatisation of South Australian ports followed the passing of the
Public Corporations Act 1993 and the South Australian Ports Corporation Act 1994. Unlike,
both the NSW and Queensland models, South Australian ports have been corporatised under a
single corporation -   the South Australian Ports Corporation (PortsCorp).  PortsCorp was
established in 1994 and is now responsible for all South Australian commercial ports taking
over all commercial assets of the former Marine and Harbours Agency and the commercial
operation and development strategies of the former Department of Marine and Harbours.
Government has minimum day to day involvement in the running of PortsCorp although,
being a corporation, it is subject to the control and direction of the Minister.
The Board of Directors, which is not elected but nominated by the Minister, is the governing
body and answers directly to the Minister for Transport.  Unlike other states, where reform
has been almost exclusively Treasury driven, Treasury is not represented on the PortsCorp
Board - although there is a Treasury observer present at Board meetings.
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The Board is currently undertaking a series of reviews of PortsCorp activities.  One of the
early recommendations to the Minister for Transport has been the privatisation of grain
loading facilities.
Western Australia. The Western Australian Minister for Transport has rejected both the
privatisation and corporatisation models and is pursuing a strategy of commercialisation.
Under this strategy ports will remain statutory authorities with trade facilitation being a major
role - landlord responsibilities, however,  will also be retained. Investigations are currently
underway whether some commercial operations should be privatised.  While statements on the
role of ports and strategies have been released by the Minister, details of administrative and
structural change are not yet available.  The emphasis on port authority reform has focused on
a coordinated approach amongst a number of relevant government departments, with the
Minister and central government agencies retaining control.
In all states and under all reform strategies there has occurred a separation of commercial
from non commercial operations.  This will mean a more cost reflective pricing system. It also
means that some non commercial loss making activities will no longer be cross subsidised, as
has occurred in the past.  In the future they will be funded separately by Treasury.
Tasmania
At the time of writing Tasmanian ports continue to operate as statutory authorities.
Tasmanian ports are intensely competitive and, in many instances, resources are under-
utilised. Rationalisation of ports has been Labor Party policy in the past but the issue has been
too sensitive politically to implement.  The current state government is investigating whether
or not to  corporatise the state’s ports  but final strategies have not been decided
upon.
4:   REAL AND UNREAL EXPECTATIONS
Privatisation and corporatisation strategies of one sort or another, proposed by or adopted by
Australian states, represent something of a quantum leap, at least conceptually.  For a long
period of entrenched bureaucratic control and power centralised in state government
departments or ministries have left a legacy of organisational and operational rigidities that are
not easily exorcised.
How effective have these policy changes been, or are likely to be, given the relatively short
time since implementation?  Have they achieved the goals that might be expected from such
strategies?  Or at least, the goals as set out in the policy statements?  In this section we focus
on these issues.
4:1  ‘You can’t have it both ways’: limitations of the policy framework
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Recognise two broad policy prescriptions for port privatisation and related strategies -
-  that the government - in the Australian context, state governments - or the public
sector is involved, in some way or another, in the administration and control of
ports.  In effect, the policy framework will be either that of corporatisation or
commercialisation.  The private sector will play a greater or lesser role in ownership
of particular assets, or services or segments of business activity; but control will be
in the hands of government; or
-  that the private sector, or ‘business’, will own and control ‘the port’.
Government’s role will be restricted to that of ‘governing’ - it will act to preserve
‘the public interest’; it will regulate where it thinks it appropriate for the common
good; and it will pay an appropriate amount to preserve the social benefits of port
operations - community service obligations, for example;  or in some circumstances
it may choose to induce trade and/or regional development by fiscal or other
measures.
In any case, the choice of policy frame is clear - either the government or public sector is
involved in the direct control and ownership of ports; or it is not.
In this context the important points are
-  that the role of government will be different in the different prescriptions and
-  that the operational and efficiency spinoffs will be subject to differing constraints
under the different prescriptions
It is important, therefore, in assessing the likely benefits or otherwise of privatisation
and related strategies to fully recognise the limitations of the policy frameworks; and to
note that once the policy frame has been set in place the options for better outcomes will
be circumscribed.  In short, corporatisation by definition means public sector involvement;
and public sector involvement means that the public interest criterion is the overriding issue
and of central importance.  Privatisation means private ownership; and private ownership
means that the market place is the arbiter of corporate behaviour.
Note, however, that the actual mechanism and framework of corporatisation - how
corporatisation is to be implemented or achieved - will also circumscribe the outcomes.
It is important, therefore, to bear this distinction - between the characteristics of the
ownership model and the characteristics of model implementation in mind.
In a later section we will look in detail at the state outcomes of the implementation of these
strategies; but in the next section we will explore in more general terms the perceptions of, or
actual outcomes of, privatisation and related strategies.
4:2  Ownership - public or private?
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The rationale for private ownership  has been that private owners operate a port more
efficiently because economic survival depends on long-run profitability.  Private ports,
consequently, are perceived to be more responsive to user needs, more aware of costs and
more innovative than public sector ports where operating losses are absorbed by governments
in any event.
Arguments for the retention of ports as public sector operations, on the other hand, point to
the fact that governments traditionally play a developmental role in ports and provide facilities
and services which may or may not realise full cost recovery except in the long term.  In
addition, in order to generate and sustain trade and associated economic activities,
governments are held responsible for the provision of essential port facilities and services - it
is frequently argued that this is more appropriately provided by the public sector.  Indeed the
Industry Commission argued that
‘seaports are integral parts of the nation’s transport system.  Their location has had a
major influence on the development of Australia’s capital infrastructure.  Their
operation then and development have implications which extend beyond the interest of
any single entity or group of firms and as such there is a public interest in the
development and maintenance of the major ports and facilities.  This public interest in
ports is the overriding rationale for the establishment and/or maintenance of public
port authorities’9.
Nor are the concepts of privatisation and corporatisation new - despite the rhetoric of the
1980s and 1990s. Privatisation, in its many forms and guises, has occurred for much of this
century.  What is new about the current trend is the extent of government assets sales and the
ideology that drives it - that private sector ownership is inherently superior to that in the
public sector.  What is also new about the latest developments is that it may be driven by the
dire economic straits of the state government - the sale of government assets has become the
means of government, not only  ridding itself of the burden of loss making operations, but of
lining government coffers.
Nor is corporatisation new - it has, in fact,  existed since the nineteenth century. It can be
traced back to the 1880s when state railway enterprises which had, until then, operated as
ministerial departments were vested in a new kind of administrative body described as the
statutory or public corporation.  They were incorporated under its statutory charter as a body
corporate and the action was a clear move to distance government business enterprises away
from the rigidities and hindrances of standard public service and governmental processes and
to allow them freedom and flexibility of private businesses.
What is really new about the current developments  is the concept of a single jurisdiction-wide
statute to provide the general framework for the establishment and operation of all public
enterprises.   In NSW the passing of legislation - NSW State Owned Corporations Act 1989 -
was followed in every other Australian state and territory - the State Owned Enterprises Act
1992 (Vic), for example, and the Territory Owned Corporations Act 1990 (ACT).  What is
novel also is that governments of all persuasions are pursuing this trend.
                                      
9 Industry Commission (1993) Ibid.
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Underlying the current developments is the belief that there is some homogeneity in all
government activities that they can be, indeed require, similar treatment - they can and should
all be reformed into commercial businesses.  Whether they are ports, airlines, banks or
electricity suppliers, they are treated in an identical manner - that, provided we subject them to
the right treatment, all will be well.
Economic health and well being, however,  are not the prerogative of private sector
management practices nor a guarantee of success. Nor, as Wilenski10 suggests, can we assume
that private sector management is intrinsically superior to that in the public sector - we can
learn from the private sector but cannot simply transfer those ideas and values from one sector
to the other.
Indeed, private sector management strategies may not necessarily be what is needed to
successfully undertake a government business.  Public sector management, and public
enterprise demands ‘all the qualities, such as administrative flair, energy, readiness to accept
responsibility, and knowledge of the principles of business organisation, that private enterprise
requires of its people , plus something else ...’public good’11.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the track record of the public sector in the  control of ports in
Australia is not a felicitous one and among a range of inadequacies we note the following -
though by no means an exhaustive list.
-  the failure to separate and distinguish between commercial and non-
commercial operations.  Profitable operations have frequently subsidised loss
making and non- commercial operations in Australian ports.  The Port of
Melbourne Authority, for example, cross subsidised losses incurred in Associated
Ports in 1991 in the order of $10.5m12; and over a long period of time NSW bulk
exporters, particularly coal shippers, cross subsidised other, less profitable, areas in
the ports;
-  the failure to identify community service obligations and to remove them from
port authority budgets for direct funding from Treasury;
-  the failure to remove non-core assets from port authority budgets and/or
control.  The transfer of the World Trade Centre in Melbourne to the Victorian
Department of Finance pending sale, for example, will relieve the Port of
Melbourne Authority of a considerable burden.  The Centre had an estimated
market value of $30m in 1992 despite the fact that the Authority had borrowed
$90m for its construction.  Not only was there a significant gap between the market
                                      
10 Wilenski, P. ‘Social Change as a Source of Competing Values in Public Administration’, Australian Journal of Public
Administration 47 (3) September 1988
11 Wettenhall, R. ‘Public Enterprise in an Age of Privatisation’ Current Affairs Bulletin 69 (9) February 1993, p 9.
12 Port of Melbounre Authority, Annual Report 1991/92.
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value of the site and the actual cost of construction, but the Centre was a chronic
loss maker incurring a loss in any one year in the order of $14m13;
-  the failure to control staffing establishments and conditions and to pursue
other than ‘soft’ labour policies.  The more recent shedding of labour by the
Maritime Services Board in Sydney is indicative of the large number of employees
in excess of needs and restructuring - from 3388 in 1984/85 to 650 in 1994/95.
Substantial productivity improvements occurred - revenue earned per employee
between 1984/85 and 1994/95 increased from $79,500 to $344,100 - an
improvement of some 332 percent14.  Operating losses of $30m in 1988/89 were
turned around to an operating surplus of $90m in 1992/9315.
But are these problems a function of, or directly attributable to, public ownership?
The simple answer is that they are not; ownership is not the critical issue at all.  The first three
problems are pricing problems; they are a function of an inadequate pricing policy, not of who
runs or operates the authority.
Nor is the fourth problem a function of ownership; it is certainly related to national industrial
relations policies and to inadequate management policies and to entrenched practices - but it is
not a direct function of ownership per se.
There is, in fact, one fundamental attribute of public sector or government ownership -
it is the assumed responsibility of social obligations; of delivering ‘the public good’; of
organising and managing the totality or the resources of a port in such a way as to
maximise the social benefits.
But what is the ‘public good’?  How is it defined?  And how is it measured?  And by whom?
And clearly there will be conflicts between economically rational solutions and socially
effective or acceptable solutions.  It may be possible to induce ports to act ‘more
commercially’ or more like ‘private enterprise businesses’; but they will not act as private
enterprise businesses would act because they will not be subject to an unconstrained market
place.
If government is to be involved in port ownership and control, then, the policy challenge is to
ensure the ‘public good’ and at the same time to achieve the highest levels of operational and
competitive efficiency.  Satisfying these dual objectives requires exceptional policy
tuning.
Private sector firms are, however, constrained by the market place; but they are not the least
bit concerned about delivering the ‘public good’ (not that they may not be concerned about
social obligations, it is simply not their prime responsibility or raison díÍtre.)
                                      
13 Report of the Victorian Commission of Audit 1993.
14 Hayes, J.C. ‘Benefits of Port Reform in NSW’ paper presented at the Chartered Institute of Transport Transport 1995
Seminar, 8 August 1995.
15 MSB Illawarra Ports Authority, Government Micro-economic Reform Program 1994  and Maritime Services Board
Annual Report 1993.
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In this scenario, the policy challenge for government is to ensure whatever level of social
equity and justice is seen to be appropriate without distorting market place mechanisms and
the efficacy of the market.  Again, careful policy formulation is clearly required.
In the next section we examine state policy outcomes for port privatisation and related
strategies in the light of these issues.
5: ASSESSING OUTCOMES OF PRIVATISATION AND RELATED
STRATEGIES IN AUSTRALIAN PORTS
5:1  Seeking efficiency?
The demand for micro-economic reform in Australia has been driven by economic necessity,
ideology and political dogma and this push has intensified as the country’s economic
performance has deteriorated.  The nation, and all states, have been under pressure.
Governments, politicians and bureaucrats alike are committed to reform.  Indeed, bureaucrats,
particularly the ‘new’ breed of bureaucrats - the rational economists - have played a very
significant role in the reform agenda.  The demand for reform in Australia followed
developments overseas and has been intensified by a general move to the right in the
prevailing economic orthodoxy and the increasing numbers and political strength of
economists in the bureaucracy.  Gregory16 argues that it has been the predominant element of
economic rationalists within the bureaucracy that has convinced politicians and the public of
the desirability of the policy - indeed, we are inclined to agree with Pucey’s wry comment that
Canberra was, over this period, ‘swept by a locust strike of economic rationalism’17.
When governments want to privatise or corporatise or commercialise ports what is it that they
really intend?  It is not unlikely that they will have a number of agenda - an ideological agenda
that suggests that all utilities should be run by government to ensure the ‘public interest’; or
alternately, an industrial relations agenda that ‘buys out’ of labour market rigidities by
encouraging private sector ownership to ‘rationalise’ labour inputs; or a budgetary agenda
that sees asset sales reducing public debt.  One or all these agenda, and numerous others for
that matter, may be embraced.
But governments will also argue for efficiency, for competition or for a more competitive
market place; they will see ‘efficient’ ports as key elements in effective trading policies and in
helping to create and sustain international competitiveness.
Conceptually, and in the best of all possible worlds, state governments will be seeking what is
described in theoretical economics as Pareto optimality - an allocation of resources such that
no consumer can be made better off without making another consumer worse off.  It is a
                                      
16 Gregory, R.G. ‘An overview of microeconomic reform’ in P. Forsyth (ed) Microeconomic Reform in Australia, Allen &
Unwin, Sydney.
17 Cited in Gregory, R.G. ibid., p306.
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condition which, in a perfectly competitive market, achieves the optimal allocation of
resources - or optimal allocative efficiency.
There are, of course, quite rigorous and unrealistic assumptions underlying the construct and
the competitive model18. Nonetheless, the notions of economic or competitive efficiency as a
function of competition and ‘efficiency optimality’ as an ideal condition of the market place,
are important in establishing a normative or reference framework for discussion of the
outcomes of privatisation and related strategies in ports.
Whether or not governments own or control the ports in one way or another or whether the
private sector owns the port, the government will seek to achieve competitive efficiency.
In either case, any departure of the market from Pareto optimal allocation - or market failure -
may (or may not) require intervention in the market place depending upon whether or not
intervention will correct the misallocation and whether or not there is benefit in so doing19.
Imperfections in the market place associated with entry barriers - levels and structure of
prices, conditions of entry and quality of service for example, externalities  - which impose
costs on other players - and internalities - where prices do not reflect costs for example - may
invite regulation.
But there may be a dilemma - if the port is in private sector ownership the government will act
as a regulator; if the government is involved in port ownership then self-regulation is called for
- which raises the issue of who it is that regulates the regulator for it may be entirely
possible that the port ownership framework per se or its operating rules actually work
against competitive efficiency.
In the following section we will attempt to assess efficiency and other outcomes of the
privatisation and related strategies and examine whether these conform with economically
rational criteria.
5.2  Efficiency and competitive efficiency?
Aiken and Capitanio20 argue that Pareto efficiency dictates that governments attempt to
conduct their businesses through entities adopting private sector precepts.  GBEs, however,
operate frequently in monopoly markets providing essential goods and services.  Community
service obligations are imposed by parliament to ensure the general population has at least
some form of equal access.  And appropriate adjustments to “corporate behaviour” may need
to take into account the purposes for which these entities were established by government.
                                      
18 See  Samuelson P.R. Economics, McGraw Hill, Tokyo, Tenth Edition 1976, p 634 “under perfectly perfect competition
where all prices end up equal to all marginal costs, where all factor-prices end up  equal to values of marginal-products
and all total costs are minimised, where the genuine desires and well-being of individuals are all represented by their
marginal utilities as expressed in their dollar voting - then the resulting  equilibrium has the efficiency property that you
can’t make any  one man better off without hurting some other man”.
19 See D.S. Spulber, Regulation and Markets (1989) MIT Press, Cambridge Mass, p 3; but see also the Introduction and
Chapter 1 for a useful discussion.
20 Aiken, M. and Capitanio, C. ‘Accrual Accounting Valuations and Accountability in Government: A Potentially
Pernicious Union’ in Australian Journal of Public Administration  Vol 54 (4) December 1995.
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The authors suggest that ‘if any of these entities can exist without any government
intervention for welfare, then they may legitimately be privatised’21.
According to this reasoning there is a valid argument in favour of privatising some ports and
they are likely to become more efficient as a result.   Victorian regional ports, for example,
consist essentially of privately owned and operated bulk facilities, often vertically integrated
with other associated corporate activities and dedicated to a  relatively small number of trades.
These facilities are already efficient operations and the retention of a public sector port
authority does little to enhance internal efficiency - it simply adds one more tier to decision
making in the port hierarchy.
But in the case of corporatised ports the issues are not straight forward and while
corporatisation should enhance internal efficiency of the corporation itself, it is not clear
whether this will enhance efficiency in the port generally.  Corporatisation is about the reform
of port authorities - public sector bodies which have been transformed into government owned
businesses.  But irrespective of reform and the manner in which management has been
restructured, they remain public sector agencies and retain ‘a public interest in the
development and maintenance of the major ports and their facilities’22.  Irrespective of how
they are restructured, corporatised ports are government responsibility, they do have social
and welfare obligations and they cannot be absolved from the responsibility relating to the
‘public good’.  The reform of port authorities into private sector replicas cannot negate these
responsibilities.
Port authorities  were reformed and corporations created so that they could operate as
businesses  - independent from bureaucratic and political interference and the landlord port
model was considered, in most states,  the most appropriate strategy.
But have port corporations been established as effective landlords?  And what is the
relationship between ‘landlordism’ and efficiency?  What is the role of a landlord and how
does a corporatised port fit this role?
A landlord traditionally is the owner of assets which are leased out for a fixed rent23. NSW
port corporations were established under the Ports Corporatisation and Waterways
Management Bill 1995 ‘......to operate the State’s port facilities in the major ports24. The
corporations, under this legislation, are not, in a strict sense,  the owners of the ports, nor of
port assets,  but controllers of leases on behalf of the state.
Under the present system, however,  they are landlords operating under some severe
restrictions. They are not free to operate with any degree of independence; they cannot
dispose of assets,  they cannot embark on further development or improvements of assets or
on new developments -  at least, not without Ministerial approval!
                                      
21 Ibid. p566.
22 Industry Commission 1993 op.cit. p39.
23 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Reprint of Fifth Edition 1975, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
24 NSW Ports Corporatisation and Waterways Management Bill 1995
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The rather restricted landlord role that has emerged is much more closely aligned with that of
a service provider - port corporations generally now provide essential port services on behalf
of government - but they are established as untenured service providers.  There is no
guarantee of permanence under present legislation as port corporations operate under a five
year licence.
Traditional port functions such as the ‘provision and maintenance of navigation aids, vessel
traffic control, pilotage services, the dredging and maintenance of channels and hydrographic
services’ are undertaken by the port corporations under a five year licence issued by the
Governor on the recommendations of the Minister25.  The licence can be revoked at any time
if performance is deemed substandard and offered to some other person or agency under
contract26.  This has presumably been to remove the comfort of a ‘job for life’ the public
sector enjoyed in the past and to ensure the internal efficiency of the corporation.  It will also
establish the level playing field by removing benefits of government ownership, in accordance
with Hilmer recommendations and conform to government competition policy.  This will
encourage corporations to provide an operationally efficient service.
The landlord model, then, is expected to deliver a revamped or restructured port corporation
plus a number of commercial operators on leased port assets and a number of service
providers.  Effective competitive structuring of the submarkets - the terminal, towage,
pilotage, stevedoring operations - should arguably provide a sound basis for operational
efficiencies.
But there are two important problems.
First, there can be no guarantee that the requirements of the ‘public good’ or public interest
constraints will not conflict with the private sector needs for corporate efficiency.  Indeed, we
can be quite certain that conflicts will arise; so that a company requiring more land, or
particular infrastructure or different ways of operating will be confronted by decisions which
may be determined by ‘public interest’ considerations.
This need not be a problem; companies will always face constraints for whatever reasons, on
their activities.  But the crucial issue is then not that a port corporation or a Minister must
make a decision; but that the decision is, in fact, for the ‘public good’ - and not for short term
political gain or expediency.  In short, it is the quality of decision-making that is crucial.
Second, there is some considerable danger that ‘landlordism’ is a reactive rather that proactive
framework for strategic development; that the landlord, with a preoccupation with a user-pays
pricing framework and an almost exclusive  focus on short term bottom-line results and with
limited ability to do other than exhort private sector operators to be ‘entrepreneurial’, will
pursue conservative investment and growth strategies.  In fact, there has been altogether too
little critical assessment of ‘landlordism’ as the appropriate model, particularly for regional
ports.  Effective port development in non-metropolitan and smaller metropolitan regions
requires the ability to act proactively and to implement strategies that will capture growth.  A
                                      
25 Ibid.
26 Minister for Ports -Second reading speech
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‘hands off’ landlord model in which the landlord has no detailed understanding of particular
operations - which is certainly the case under many lease arrangements in Australian ports - is
in fact likely to severely constrain effective strategic development.
It need not, of course, be so; but we will return to this point in the following section
5.3  Competition between ports
Many of the arguments in favour of reform focus on competition - that, quite simply,
privatised and corporatised ports will be more competitive.
Indeed an essential feature of micro-economic reform is the concept of competition.
Competition and the striving for it has become the driving force for change in Australian
industries, including ports. Australian industries, the Hilmer report argued
‘have no choice but to improve the productivity and international competitiveness of
its firms and businesses ... Competition provides the spur for businesses to improve
their performance, develop new products and respond to changing circumstances.
Competition offers the promise of lower prices and improve choice for consumers and
greater efficiency, higher economic growth and increased employment opportunities
for the economy as a whole’27.
The Australian governments’ competition policy has not recommended ownership changes per
se nor has it included strategies to corporatise ports as such.  What it is attempting to achieve
is the establishment of government instrumentalities within the context of a more competitive
environment generally.  Ports within this context are encouraged to be competitive and by
creating a non-protectionist environment28 generally,  place them on a similar footing as any
other private sector organisation.
In what way can privatisation and corporatisation strategies enhance competition between
ports?  How much competition exists between Australian ports and how competitive can they
really become?
Some competition does already exist between Victorian ports - up to 20 percent of Geelong
cargo is ‘discretionary’ - that is it can be shipped through either Portland or Melbourne.
Portland competes with Geelong and Adelaide for cargoes such as woodchips, grain,
fertilisers and live sheep -   each port using different marketing and pricing policies to attract
trade.  Geelong also competes with Hastings for some petroleum products.   Privatisation of
these ports and the adoption of more aggressive marketing strategies should intensify
competition between them.
In other states there are also some instances of inter port competition. In Western Australia
where Bunbury and Fremantle compete for alumina and steel billets and Port Hedland and
                                      
27 Report of the Independent Committee of Inquiry (1993) National Competition Policy, AGPS, Canberra (Hilmer
Report).
28 By the imposition of tax equivalent payments, for example, and the expectations of profitable performances.
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Dampier compete for iron ore exports and the servicing of offshore oil and gas platforms.
Some competition between NSW ports also exists but tends to be restricted to break bulk
cargoes such as timber which can be shipped through either Newcastle or Port Jackson.
Clearly, bulk cargoes will,  for the most part, move to the closest terminal - accessibility to
ports and the cost of land transport will determine this.  But the increasing flexibility of
movement for containerised cargoes provided by new intermodal and shipping arrangements is
inducing some competition between capital city ports.
But there is a more important issue - privatisation and corporatisation and commercialisation
strategies engender competitive actions.  Indeed, good business practice itself - quite apart
from particular ownership frameworks - rests upon aggressive commercial posturing.
To what extent, then, has corporatisation in NSW provided the framework for competitive
port managements?
It is arguable, again, that the constraints of the ‘public good’ or the public interest will inhibit
competition - will, in fact, provide a framework for anti-competitive strategies.  Legislation
determines that it will be the Minister who determines resource allocation and infrastructure
developments; it is the Minister, rather than the market, who will determine the competitive
positioning of ports; it is the Minister who will determine what  initiatives  may or may not be
taken and when.
Is it not likely, then, that the overriding guideline for development strategies in NSW ports -
and perhaps ports in other states - will be risk aversion?  Will the focus on politically correct
economic rationalism result in too-conservative strategies that may be ‘safe’ in the short run
but will depress long-run dynamism?
It need not necessarily be so; and again our argument underlines our earlier position - that the
problem is not with a legitimate concern of government for the protection of the ‘public good’
or public interest but with whether or not the decision itself does in fact reflect the ‘public
good’ - and not short term political expediency or political interest.
5.4  Administrative structure simplified?
Reform in virtually all states has meant that ports, rather than operating independently and
without undue political interference, are  now subject to an intensification of central
government control.  Indeed, widespread concern has been expressed by most former port
authorities on their diminished role;  that reform is driven almost exclusively by Treasury and
central government bureaucracies.
Reform in most states has meant that ports, rather than operating under a simplified
bureaucratic structure, are in fact operating within a more complex one and this is impacting
on internal efficiency and profitability.  In NSW, for example, prior to corporatisation, all
ports were under the umbrella of the former MSB.  This comprised a head office with
responsibility for corporate strategy and planning, finance and marine safety.  The Board was
managed by a Chief Executive who reported to the Portfolio Minister.  Within this structure
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there existed four subsidiary authorities functioning on a day to day basis with relative
operational independence - there was one political master and one bureaucratic tier in the
system.
The corporatisation of NSW ports and the separation of operational and policy responsibilities
has meant the creation of a number of bureaucracies.  Besides the three port corporations, a
central controlling body has been established, the Office of Marine Safety and Port Strategy,
which is the conduit between the port corporations and the Portfolio Minister.  This office
determines how port corporations operate.  It issues licences  to the port corporations to
undertake navigation and other functions - licences which are presently, but not necessarily,
issued to port corporations.
Apart from the additional bureaucratic structure, corporatisation in NSW has meant that ports
now have two political masters - the Shareholders and the Portfolio Minister and within this
structure the potential for conflict is inherent.  The Shareholders, one of whom is the
Treasurer, are concerned with profitability and return on government assets while the
Portfolio Minister is responsible for efficiency and the operations of the port.  But it is the
Portfolio Minister who, in a sense, determines profitability for the Shareholders as it is the
Portfolio Minister who sets port prices.
Industry sources indicate that conflict already has emerged between the Shareholders and the
Portfolio Minister over profitability and return on assets.  Conflict has also arisen over the size
of the Office of the Marine Safety and Port Strategy.  This is considered a top heavy, largely
superfluous bureaucratic structure with numbers far exceeding requirement, costly and
eroding profits29.
The establishment and maintenance of a large bureaucratic structure, such as the Office of
Marine Safety and Port Strategy has also eroded revenue of port corporations.  A newly
imposed charge, the Port Cargo Access Charge, will be levied to maintain the Office.  This,
however, is not an additional charge on shippers, but replaces, in part,  wharfage which
previously was revenue flowing to the port authorities30.  This has meant that some income of
port corporations has been hived off in order to support a newly created, inflated bureaucratic
structure.
Further fragmentation and separation of responsibilities has occurred with the establishment of
the Marine Ministerial Holding Company to which has been transferred all ‘non-core’ port
related assets. The establishment of this Company has also restricted the revenue base of the
corporations.  A rather narrow definition has been adopted as to what constitutes ‘core’  - this
is almost exclusively cargo related. This definition has meant a loss of revenue for the
corporations as revenue generating assets, such as the casting basin in Port Kembla and the
cruise ship berths in Darling Harbour have been transferred to the Marine Ministerial Holding
Company.
                                      
29 Personal communication
30 Ibid.
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Apart from financial, this also has marketing and promotion implications  for the corporations.
There is no surplus to which the corporation has immediate access.  Indeed if port land is
vacant for more than a year it is transferred to the Holding Company.  Should the port
corporation at some future date require the land for expansion it must then be purchased  from
the Holding Company.
Has port authority reform by way of corporatisation legislation thrown the baby out with the
bath water? As far as ownership of port assets are concerned have we moved from one
extreme to another?  The former port authorities held vast quantities of assets.  Industry
sources have indicated that they were widespread; in some instances it was not known
precisely what assets the MSB held.  In  other instances some assets had very little relevance
to the operations of a port - the  World Trade Centre developed by the Port of Melbourne
Authority, for example. In other instances assets were derelict or land was held for decades or
more, on the speculation that it may be required one day - these all had very serious pricing
and asset valuation implications.
But under the present system,   port corporations do not hold land for future development.
Being expected to operate commercially they must have the responsible for business
development and expansion and it has been argued that not only has this development
restricted their revenue generation but has impacted on their ability to market and promote the
port.
5.5  Independence and control of ones destiny?
Can ports, given the legislative and political constraints, operate  commercially and
competitively?  Have ports been granted the autonomy from government and bureaucratic
control recommended by the Industry Commission?  Are ports free to operate independently
as businesses in the private sector?
Privatised ports, such as the Victorian bulk ports, will be able to operate independently from
political and bureaucratic control and it is anticipated that, once the process is complete, they
will be subject to regulatory constraints identical with those imposed on any other private
sector operation.  In corporatised ports, however, the degree of independence and control of
one’s destiny is determined by and written into the legislation.  It is also dependent on whether
the model adopted is interventionist or not.  The Queensland model, on the one hand, appears
to allow ports relative operational independence.  The NSW model, on the other hand,  is
interventionist and has the Portfolio Minister in a pivotal role.
The NSW Minister for Ports, for example,  has argued in Parliament that corporatisation of
ports was ‘about giving the ports a regional and commercial focus ... and the independence to
allow them to control their own destinies’31.  But corporatised ports in NSW do not control
their own destinies; they cannot set prices; they cannot enter into contractual arrangements;
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they cannot dispose of assets; they cannot develop new infrastructure - these issues all require
Ministerial and central government approval.
If ports,  then,  cannot operate independent of government intervention,  if they cannot be
entrepreneurial in approach, if they cannot control their own destinies how commercial can
they, in fact,  be?  And if they are not free from political and bureaucratic interference can we
expect them to operate like a private business venture?  Is it in any way meaningful to
compare them with business operations in the private sector?
NSW ports, under present corporatisation legislation,  cannot operate like private companies
and it is a nonsense to suggest that they can.  They were not established as  private companies.
Indeed amended legislation in NSW specifically determined that political control would be
maintained -  in some instances it has been intensified. The independence ports were to enjoy
and their ability to control their own destinies were removed by the amended legislation and
this was to maintain, or strengthen, and not reduce,  political control.  There is no doubt that
this constraint will impede  commercial operation and success.
5.6  The baby and the bathwater: a cautionary note
Self32 has argued that the pruning of government  activities along market lines,  has led to the
division of government into ‘a host of public agencies, each providing a “service” to a
particular set of “consumers” according to tests of business efficiency, and with a financial
incentive to avoid any contribution for which it is not formally responsible’.
But, as Plowden33 points out, these agencies are to provide public services with the authority
and the resources of the state; and at the end of the day it is the citizens of the state - the
broad polity and not some particular subset of it - that are the recipients of the so-called
‘public good’.
There is some considerable danger that ports, operating within an inadequately defined and
poorly implemented corporatisation framework and in a concerted and even well-meaning
attempt to ‘become efficient’, may dispense with the baby as well as with the bathwater - that
in the chase for short-term efficiency, medium to longer term benefits will be sacrificed.  It is
imperative that this should not be the case; and that appropriate mechanisms are set in place to
prevent it from happening.
There are a number of reasonable propositions that suggest that if ports are profitable and
efficient they will be contributing to the public good; and likewise, that if assets remain in the
public domain, that if there is a reasonable return on assets, that if revenues and rewards of
efficiency are redistributed to the citizens at large then ports will be operating in such a way as
to be contributing to the public good.
                                      
32 Self, P. ‘The consequences of reorganising government on market lines’ in Australian Journal of Public Administration
54 (3) September 1995.
33 Plowden, W. ‘Public interests the public services serve: efficiency and other values’ in Australian Journal of Public
Administration 53 (3) September 1994.
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But the public interest must also be served by defining for ports - both for individual ports as
well as for clusters of ports or port systems - strategies which will be effective in enhancing
both regional as well as trade development over the medium to longer term, strategic issues
which are most likely to conflict with the pressures for short run efficiency and balanced
annual budgets.
6:  CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Privatisation models such as those being implemented in Victoria, remove government from
ownership responsibilities and operations of the ports.  In ports where trades and users are
limited and there is no impact on public interest concerns, the sale of these operations and the
complete withdrawal by government may be most expeditious.
Under a corporatisation regime, government has specifically chosen to retain ownership;  but
policy prescribes that government businesses will be profitable.  A chronic potential problem
in this strategy is that the ports must be operated as profitable businesses, but businesses in
which politicians retain considerable control.  Government ownership per se  demands that
ports are operated in the public interest - or that they are operated in such a way as to deliver
the ‘public good’; and it is this public interest criterion - not efficiency or competitiveness or
any other attribute for that matter - that is the fundamental, distinguishing characteristic of the
strategy.
Once this policy prescription is set the critical issue is how best to deliver the public interest or
the public good?  What sort of legislative and administrative framework will ensure
appropriate outcomes?
Interventionist models - in which bureaucratic and ministerial control effectively remove the
ability of ports to operate in the market place and, in fact, impose significant constraints on
achieving competitive efficiency - do not deliver the ‘public good’.
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